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RESPONSE TO CROSS APPELLANT'S BRIEF
I.

THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED THE CORRECT LAW IN
DENYING THE RESPONDENT'S REQUEST FOR
ATTORNEY'S FEES
In his Cross Appellant's Brief, the Respondent alleges that the trial court

erred in denying his request for attorney's fees made under Utah Code Ann. § 773a-101(16), which states, "After a hearing with notice to the affected party, the
court may enter an order requiring any party to pay the costs of the action,
including reasonable attorney's fees." The Respondent alleges that the trial court
erred in analyzing his request for attorney's fees using the three-pronged test set
forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 as interpreted in Chipman v. Miller, 934 P.2d
1158 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). The Court found that attorney fees were proper if (1)
the party seeking fees prevailed, (2) the claim or defense asserted by the opposing
party was meritless, and (3) that claim or defense was asserted in bad faith. Id. at
1161.
In A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating v. Guv. 94 P.3d 270 (Utah
2004), the Utah Supreme Court states, "when reviewing attorney fee decisions that
involve questions of law, we review for correctness .. . This is also the standard
we apply when construing statutes." IcL at 272. The question of whether the Judge
correctly concluded that § 78-27-56 supplements § 77-3&-101(16) is a question of
law to be reviewed for correctness.
The question of whether § 78-27-56 applies to supplement § 77-3a-101(16)
is a question of first impression in Utah. The trial court Judge stated, "The court is

persuaded that Section 78-27-56 governs the awarding of an attorney fee in actions
involving a civil stalking injunction." (Ruling on Verified Application for Atty's
Fees and Costs at 2).
It is reasonable that with such a broad grant of discretion in whether to
grant attorney's fees, the trial court would seek to make the decision based on
sound judicial principles. In fact, the trial court is required to set forth the grounds
on which it made its decision: "To permit meaningful review of the trial court's
discretionary ruling, '[w]e have consistently encouraged trial courts to make
findings to explain the factors which they considered relevant in arriving at an
attorney fee award . . . " Bell v. Bell 810 P.2d 474, 478 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Failure by the trial court to be sufficiently detailed in its legal conclusions and
findings of fact leads to remand by the appellate courts. Shinkoskey v.
Shinkoskev, 19 P.3d 1005, 1010 (Utah Ct. App. 2001).
The U.S. Supreme Court reiterated the importance of this: "A motion to a
court's "discretion" is a motion, not to its inclination or whim, but to its judgment;
and its judgment is to be guided by sound legal principles." Martin v. Franklin
Capital Corp., 2005 WL 3299410 (U.S.) at 5. The Supreme Court has specifically
addressed motions for attorney's fees by stating, "When applying fee-shifting
statutes, 'we have found limits in 'the large objectives' of the relevant Act, which
embrace certain 'equitable considerations.'" Id
In Fogertv v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994), the United States Supreme
Court, in a case involving a fee-shifting statute almost identical to Utah Code Ann.

§ 78-3a-101(16), stated that Section 505 of the Copyright Protection Act provides
that, "the court may . . . award a reasonable attorney's fee to the prevailing party
as part of the costs." Id at 517.
The Court suggested that in determining whether to award attorney's fees
under a fee-shifting statute, " . . . equitable discretion should be exercised 'in light
of considerations we have identified.'" Id. at 534. The Court further elaborated on
these "equitable considerations" in Footnote 19:
Some courts following the evenhanded standard have suggested
several nonexclusive factors to guide courts' discretion. For
example, the Third Circuit has listed several nonexclusive factors
that courts should consider in making awards of attorney's fees to
any prevailing party. These factors include, 'frivolousness,
motivations, objective unreasonableness (both in the factual and the
legal components of the case), and the need in particular
circumstances to advance considerations of compensation and
deterrence. We agree that such factors may be used to guide courts'
discretion, so long as such factors are faithful to the purposes of the
Copyright Act and are applied to prevailing plaintiffs and defendants
in an evenhanded manner. Id.
In that the Chipman factors used by the trial court to guide its decisionmaking closely match the factors the Supreme Court listed in Fogerty, they are
appropriate equitable guides.
Furthermore, the Chipman factors, as expostulated in Utah Code Ann. §7827-56 embody the desires of the Utah State Legislature in awarding attorney's fees
in civil actions. Because the stalking injunction in the case at bar is a civil action,
it is appropriate to look to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 to determine what factors

the Utah State Legislature considered important in determining whether attorney
fees should be shifted to an opposing party in a civil case.
The Respondent suggests that Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-3a-101(16) and 7827-56 somehow conflict and that the application of § 77-3a-101(16) precludes
analysis under § 78-27-56. It is submitted that the statutes are not in conflict.
Section 77-3a-101(16) gives the court authorization to award attorney's fees in its
discretion, and § 78-27-56 provides some equitable guides for attorney fees in
civil cases.
It is clearly appropriate to apply the principles of § 78-27-56 to this case
because it involves a petition for court protection by a victim of an alleged sexual
assault and subsequent stalking. Sound public policy dictates these victims not be
afraid to petition the court for help. It would be a very serious and dangerous
precedent for a trial court to begin shifting the burden of paying attorney's fees to
a victim of stalking who did not prevail in the trial court. It is appropriate for the
trial court to require a Respondent who wants the trial court to shift his or her
defense fees to the Petitioner to first prove that the Petitioner's stalking case is
without merit and was not pursued in good faith. If the trial court were to shift fees
upon any lesser showing of bad faith, it would have a serious chilling effect on the
willingness of stalking victims to seek the protection of the courts. Many victims
might expose themselves to the danger of further stalking or assault rather than
face the prospect of being ordered to pay costly attorney fees if they fail to prevail.
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capable of supporting a finding in favor of the judgment." Kinkella v. Baugh, 660
P.2d 233 (Utah 1983). Utah appellate courts often apply the "harmless error"
doctrine to deny remand for mistakes that do not affect the outcome of a case. In
Liskav. Liska, 902 P.2d 644 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), this Court stated the following:
The commissioner erred by failing to make a record of her
communication with the Colorado magistrate regarding the
assumption of jurisdiction by the Colorado court. However, such
error was harmless because the commissioner's recommendation to
decline to exercise Utah's continuing jurisdiction over this case, and
the trial court's decision based thereon, were inarguably correct.
Accordingly, we affirm. Id. at 650.
Similarly, in this case, it is clear that regardless of how it reached its
conclusion, the trial court was correct not to require the Petitioner to pay the
Respondent's attorney's fees. The trial court made explicit findings supporting its
conclusion:
Specifically, the claim brought by the petitioner had serious merit
and was brought in good faith. The court previously found that the
petitioner had been the victim of a vicious sexual assault committed
by the respondent resulting in the petitioner experiencing anxiety
and panic when she was around the respondent subsequent to the
assault It was therefore reasonable that the petitioner would seek to
limit the respondent's ability to be in her presence through the means
of a stalking injunction. Moreover, the respondent has not shown
that the petitioner's claim was frivolous or that it was of little weight
or importance having no basis in law or fact. To the contrary, the
court finds that the petitioner's claim that the respondent was
stalking her had a supportable basis in fact even though the
petitioner did not prevail (Ruling on Verified Application for Atty's
Fees and Costs at 2.)
A trial court's findings of fact are entitled to great deference. It would be
manifestly unjust to require a victim of sexual assault and subsequent stalking to
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APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MISINTERPRETING THE
"EMOTIONAL DISTRESS" REQUIREMENT OF UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-5-106.5; PETITIONER IS REQUESTING THE COURT
TO CORRECT THE ERROR, NOT TO "LEGISLATE," AS
RESPONDENT ALLEGES.
In his brief, the Respondent alleges that the Petitioner is asking the Court to

"legislate" by clarifying the definition of "emotional distress" for purposes of
satisfying Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5. That is, Respondent suggests that if this
Court rules on this issue it would constitute judicial activism.
Petitioner is not urging the Court to legislate, but rather is seeking to show
that the trial court erred in applying the definition of "emotional distress" set forth
in the criminal case of Salt Lake City v. Lopez, 953 P.2d 1259, 1264 (Utah Ct.
App. 1997) to a civil stalking case, and to urge the Court to correct the error.
Petitioner maintains that the trial court erred in using the Lopez definition
of "emotional distress," i.e., only conduct that is 'outrageous and intolerable' in
that it offends the generally accepted standards of decency and morality is
sufficient to satisfy the "emotional distress" requirement of §§ 76-5-106.5, 77-3a101(1). The burden of proof is different in civil cases. It is submitted that in
applying the Lopez definition of "emotional distress," the trial court used a
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of proof rather than the correct standard, a
preponderance of the evidence.
Respondent alleges that the Petitioner failed to preserve her right to appeal
the standard of proof issue by not objecting to the "Order Dissolving Ex Parte

Civil Stalking Injunction." It is true that the Petitioner did not object to the Order
pursuant to Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This was because
the trial court had entered its final order dismissing the action, and Petitioner did
not wish to waste her timefilingan objection to a final, dispositive judgment with
the trial court. Instead, she filed a timely Notice of Appeal on February 25, 2005
appealing thefinaljudgment of the trial court. Petitioner believes that the Notice
of Appeal adequately preserved the issue for appeal.
Even if this Court does determine that the Lopez definition of "emotional
distress" can properly be applied in a civil case, the Petitioner is still not asking
this Court to "legislate." The trial court erred in ruling that the only means by
which the Petitioner could prove "emotional distress" was by showing that the
Respondent's conduct was "'outrageous and intolerable' in that it offends the
generally accepted standards of decency and morality." Id. This was not the
holding in Lopez. The trial court's decision ignores the plain text of § 76-5-106.5,
which states that the conduct must be such that a "reasonable person" under the
circumstances would experience emotional distress. This Court clearly applied a
"reasonable person" standard in Lopez when it stated that, "Defendant had
numerous contacts with G.M.M. that reasonably would cause her emotional
distress. Defendant was not prosecuted merely for being in G.M.M.'s presence; he
was prosecuted for causing emotional distress to G.M.M. and engaging in
behavior directed at her that could reasonably be understood as threatening." Id at
1264-65. The Petitioner is asking this Court to properly apply the entire Lopez

definition of emotional distress, which includes the objective "reasonable person"
under the circumstances test, not just the "outrageous and intolerable" portion
exclusively relied on by the trial court.
Petitioner further maintains that if the Court applies the Lopez definition of
emotional distress to this case, it should distinguish it from the "outrageous and
intolerable" standard cited in Lopez, which is derived from tort law. Petitioner has
previously cited extensive case law showing that Utah is the only state that has not
yet distanced itself from the tort-based definition of "emotional distress."
The Petitioner is asking this court to do precisely what the Tenth Circuit did
in Veile v. Martinson, 258 F.3d 1180, 1189 (10th Cir. 2001). The Tenth Circuit
clarified that to satisfy the "emotional distress" requirement of the Wyoming State
Stalking Statute did not require any reference to tort law: " . . . We believe the
absence of a discussion about the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress
in the opinion [Luplow v. State] (save for its presence in some of the cases cited in
the opinion) means the tort's requirements and elements have no bearing on the
separate, statutorily-defined civil action for stalking." In one sentence, the Tenth
Circuit clarified any confusion that the Wyoming stalking statute's definition of
emotional distress should be defined by any reference to tort law. The Tenth
Circuit, rather than "legislating," was clarifying the existing definition. In his
brief, Respondent states, "Respondent urges this Court to employ judicial restraint
and simply review this case based on plain and ordinary language that the Utah
Legislature choose (sic) to utilize" (Appellee's Brief at 15.) This is what the

Petitioner is urging by requesting the-Court to analyze this case under the
objective "reasonable person" language of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-106.5 and to
downplay the "separate, statutorily-defined" stalking statute's reference to the tort
of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Veile v. Martinson, 258 F.3d 1180,
1189 (10th Cir. 2001).
II.

EXAMINATION OF A "COURSE OF CONDUCT" BY
DEFINITION REQUIRES ACCUMULATIVE ANALYSIS, AND
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ANALZYING THE ALLEGED
INCIDENTS OF STALKING SEPARATELY.
The Respondent alleges that the "plain and ordinary" language of Utah

Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5 requires a reader to examine each alleged incident of
stalking separately and determine whether there are at least two incidents that rise
to the level of being "outrageous and intolerable in that [they] offend the generally
accepted standards of decency and morality." Salt Lake City v. Lopez, 935 P.2d
1259, 1264 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). It is counter-intuitive to analyze incidents
constituting a "course of conduct/' separately, particularly in a stalking context.
The Alaska Court of Appeals explained the reasoning behind examining the
cumulative effect of individual acts of stalking:
In contrast the actus reus of the crime of stalking is defined as a
series of acts. The stalking statute requires the State to prove that the
defendant engaged in a "course of conduct" comprising "repeated
acts of nonconsensual contact." It is the defendant's course of
conduct, not the defendant's individual acts that must engender the
requisite fear in the victim. Moreover, in a stalking prosecution, the
individual acts committed by the defendant are not necessarily
criminal in themselves; rather, they become criminal because they
are committed in series. Cook v. Alaska, 36 P.2d 710, 721 (Ala. Ct.
App. 2001).

Further, The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has stated, "It is
the continuing course of conduct which constitutes the offense, not the individual
discrete actions making up the course of conduct." Washington v. United States,
760 A.2d 187, 198-99 (D.C. App. 2000).
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that factors to be considered in
analyzing a "course of conduct" in the context of a criminal statute, Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-415. l(3)(g), is that if "all of these acts were essentially
interchangeable, occurred over a defined period of time and in the same
uninterrupted course of conduct..." Utah v. Reed, 8 P.3d 1025, 1031 (Utah
2000).
In this case, the incidents occurred over the period of a few months, many
of them on successive days. They were largely interchangeable and, if considered
separately, no one incident might rise to the level of being criminal, (although this
is not true of the incidents that also constituted a violation of the Ex Parte Stalking
Injunction). If the trial court had examined the incidents cumulatively, it would
have found that the incidents together demonstrate a clear pattern of maintaining
"physical and visual" proximity to the Petitioner and clearly show the
Respondent's intent to cause her fear and emotional distress. Therefore, the trial
court erred in failing to analyze the incidents collectively as a course of conduct,
as required by the statute.

III.

PETITIONER PROPERLY PRESERVED THE ISSUE OF
WHETHER VIOLATION OF AN EX PARTE STALKING
INJUNCTION IS GROUNDS FOR IMMEDIATE ENTRY OF A
PERMANENT STALKING INJUNCTION PURSUANT TO UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-5-106.5(3).
The Respondent alleges in his Appellee's brief that the Petitioner failed to

preserve the issue of whether violation of the Ex Parte Stalking Injunction was
grounds for immediate entry of a permanent stalking injunction (Appellee's Brief
at 19-20). The analysis is incorrect.
Respondent cites Tolman v. Winchester Hills Water Co., 912 P.2d 457, 461
(Utah Ct. App. 1996) to say that in order to preserve an issue for appeal, a party
must provide "supporting evidence or relevant legal authority" to support its
argument. Petitioner agrees, and she did so in the trial court. The Respondent
alleges that the only argument Petitioner gave in support of her position was to
attempt to compare a violation of an Ex Parte Stalking Injunction with a violation
of an Ex Parte Protective Order. The Respondent's brief cites large portions of the
Petitioner's admittedly imperfect articulation of that argument to support the
proposition that Petitioner failed to cite any relevant legal authority. The fact is
that the Petitioner also clearly cited and discussed Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5
(3) as legal authority, which states, "A person is also guilty of stalking who
intentionally or knowingly violates a stalking injunction issued pursuant to Title
77, Chapter 3a, Stalking Injunctions, or intentionally or knowingly violates a
permanent criminal stalking injunction issued pursuant to this section." Petitioner

cited this statute in the record at pages 293-94 and again at page 296. This
discussion is more than adequate to preserve this issue for appeal.
The Respondent goes on to state that "the Petitioner adds language that
does not appear in either statute." Petitioner is clearly citing to § 76-5-106.5(3),
which states in clear, unambiguous language that "a person is also guilty of
stalking who intentionally or knowingly violates a stalking injunction . . . "
Petitioner merely makes the natural inference that an Ex Parte Stalking Injunction
is a bona fide stalking injunction falling within the purviews of this statutory
provision.
CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse the trial court's summary judgment dismissing
the Petitioner's case and enter a permanent stalking injunction against the
Respondent because she proved a prima facie case of stalking in the trial court.
The Petitioner further requests that a permanent stalking injunction be entered on
the independent basis that the Respondent violated the Ex Parte Stalking
Injunction.
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